How to Avoid Unauthorized Release of BWC Video

The family of a man shot by an officer in Bay Minette, AL, in August 2022, has filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the city, the police department and the involved officer. Details of the incident can be found here. The officer was wearing a body camera, and it was activated. The shooting was investigated by the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) Major Crimes Unit. Their findings were sent to the Alabama Attorney General’s Office who reviewed all the evidence, to include the body camera video, and subsequently determined that there was no probable cause that the officer committed an offense. The BCSO shared the findings with the man’s family and all parties agreed (according to BCSO) that they would not release any evidence or provide further details to the public. Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court later ruled last year that the video will not be released to the public or media. The family subsequently filed the lawsuit. The case is currently being tried. The family has claimed that BCSO refused to release the body camera footage, among other evidence, to the family prior to the trial. Two weeks ago, the body camera video of the incident was released on YouTube by an anonymous source in violation of the federal trial judge’s orders. The family and their attorney claim that the unauthorized release will taint the jury and skew public perception. The BCSO has opened an internal investigation to determine the source of the leak. On March 15th, it was reported that an email containing a share file and password to the footage was included publicly in the federal court filings.

This series of events reinforces points that I repeatedly emphasized:

·      You’ve lost control of what happens to your BWC video once it leaves the purview of your agency.

·      It’s imperative that you have tight video access permissions in your digital evidence management system (DEMS).

·      Conduct periodic, agency level, audits of your DEMS access permissions and logs to verify there have been no violations

·      Tightly restrict access to videos of critical or sensitive incidents.

·      Ensure that you review and archive the access logs of any video of critical or sensitive incidents before you electronically transfer it outside the agency.

The preceding points are all within the control of the agency to manage. The following actions are recommended but may not be possible for every agency due to practices or limitations at the prosecutor level:

·      Establish a single point of contact to receive videos at the prosecutor’s office.

·      Electronic transfer of video is ideal. This may not always be possible or desired by the prosecutor’s office. If they want video delivered on a hard disc/drive, ensure that medium of transferred using your agency’s physical evidence chain of custody transfer process.

·      Do not transfer video to the defense bar. That is the responsibility of the prosecutor’s office.

Following all the above may not avoid being accused of unauthorized release but those accusations can be easily countered by the police agency. The focus can then shift to an unauthorized release from outside of the agency.

One last note. Screen capture programs and cell phone recording of a video are still possible anywhere along the line. Agency information technology support should be able to determine if a screen capture program was downloaded on an agency computer. Cell phone recording could happen anywhere within the agency. However, strict access permissions and log reviews can narrow down anyone within the agency that might have made such a recording.

The BCSO Sheriff, Anthony Lowery, indicated that he believes the leak did not come from anyone on the “state side”. It will be interesting to see the results of his investigation.